Do financial constraints really matter? A case of understudied African firms by Machokoto, Michael
R E S E A R CH AR T I C L E
Do financial constraints really matter? A case of
understudied African firms
Michael Machokoto
The Faculty of Business and Law,
University of Northampton, Waterside
Campus, University Drive,
Northampton, UK
Correspondence
Michael Machokoto, The Faculty of
Business and Law, University of
Northampton, Waterside Campus,
University Drive, Northampton NN1 5PH,
UK.
Email: michael.machokoto@
northampton.ac.uk
Abstract
Using a system of equations to account for the simultaneity, inter-temporal
and interdependent nature of corporate decisions, we document several new
insights into how emerging market firms allocate funds across competing uses-
of-funds. Emerging market firms save most of the operating cash flow. When
the firms spend, they allocate the remainder to dividend payments first,
followed by debt retirements, then equity repurchases and lastly investments.
This pecking order of prioritizing savings and dividends ahead of other uses-
of-funds highlight difficulties in accessing external finance and a stubbornly
resilient signalling motive for firms operating under a high degree of informa-
tion asymmetry and agency costs. We further find significant asymmetry and
heterogeneity in the allocation of funds conditional on credit constraints, devi-
ations from target and around the financial crisis. Our findings signal the need
for policies that improve access to external finance and information disclosure
in emerging markets.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Do financial constraints affect real economic activities? If
so, what are the channels through which they affect real
activities? How do we measure and test for financial con-
straints? These questions have been explored several
times, but in all cases, the results are inconclusive.1 How-
ever, apart from the evidence on developed economies,
we know little about how financial constraints affect
investment and financing decisions in emerging capital
markets. We attempt to fill this lacuna by examining how
emerging market firms allocate operating cash flow to
savings, investments, dividends, debt retirements and
equity repurchases. By examining all uses-of-funds as
opposed to adopting a piecemeal approach of focusing on
either investment-cash flow sensitivity or cash flow-sensi-
tivity of cash, our study provides new insights on the
impact of financial constraints on investment and financ-
ing decisions.
Changes in how firms allocate funds have real impli-
cations on firm growth, employment and economic
growth. For example, building-up cash reserves entail
reducing or postponing current investments. At the same
time, this accumulation of savings indicates increasing
difficulties in accessing external finance, which is of
interest to policymakers, particularly in less-developed
capital markets. Similarly, a high allocation of funds to
dividends signals a lack of other viable monitoring
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mechanisms in the form of governance and institutional
structures (Brav, Graham, Harvey, & Michaely, 2005; He,
Ng, Zaiats, & Zhang, 2017; Iturriaga & Crisóstomo, 2010)
or the lack of further growth opportunities. The former
requires that managers adopt a high dividend payout to
signal the quality of the firm in the presence of a high
degree of information asymmetry and agency costs. At
the same time, the latter is plausible, but less so for
emerging markets that are less saturated and have lower
barriers to entry (see Panibratov, 2017). This rules out the
latter and leaves the signalling motive as the most plausi-
ble reason why emerging market firms would payout
most of the funds rather than retain and re-investment,
which negatively impact on firm-growth, employment
and economic growth. On the other hand, high alloca-
tions to debt repayments and equity repurchases per se
are indicative of better access to external finance (active
capital markets), hence boosting firm-growth, employ-
ment and economic growth.2 Therefore, understanding
how emerging market firms allocate funds represents an
interesting research question with wider economic and
welfare implications.
To accomplish the above objective, we estimate a sys-
tem of equations relating the five uses-of-funds to operat-
ing cash flow and several control variables and lagged
uses-of-funds to account for the interdependence and
inter-temporal nature of corporate decisions. This aspect is
particularly pertinent in emerging markets where access
to external finance is much limited, and firms rely mostly
on internal sources of capital, thereby, making investment
and financing decisions more inter-temporal and
interdependent. We then test for asymmetry in cash flow
allocations or sensitivities conditional on four commonly
used measures of credit constraints. To shed further
insights on whether cash flow sensitivities are asymmetric,
we use a quasi-natural experiment in the form of the finan-
cial crisis, which is mainly external and reliably orthogo-
nal to local credit market conditions in emerging markets.
Using this external and unexpected credit supply shock
increases our ability to test and discriminate among sev-
eral plausible propositions that have been advanced in the
literature (see Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004;
Chang, Dasgupta, Wong, & Yao, 2014; Gatchev, Pulvino,
& Tarhan, 2010; Lewellen & Lewellen, 2016). In addition,
we also investigate whether non-linearities in cash flow
and deviations from target cash holdings, investment, divi-
dends and capital structure influence allocations across
the five uses-of-funds. This part of our analysis seeks to
shed further empirical insights on the often-overlooked
interdependence of investment and financing decisions.
Using a sample of 5,940 firm-year observations from
eight emerging economies from 2000–2015, and a system
of equations framework for five uses-of-funds, we find a
noteworthy pecking order in the allocation of funds and
significant interdependence of investment and financing
decisions. Specifically, the sampled emerging market
firms save 44% of operating cash flow. When they spend,
they allocate the remainder in order of proportions to
dividend payments first (19%), followed by debt retire-
ments (15%), then equity repurchases (14%), and lastly
investments (8%). This pecking order in the allocation of
funds reveals several insights on how firms make invest-
ment and financing decisions in the presence of binding
credit constraints, information asymmetry and agency
costs. Notably, the disproportionately high savings
emphasize the maintenance or enhancement of financial
flexibility as a more critical goal that ranks ahead of all
other uses-of-funds when access to external finance is
limited. Therefore, this accumulation of cash reserves,
which often entails cutting back or postponing invest-
ments, should be of concern to investors and
policymakers alike as it hampers firm-growth, and conse-
quently, employment and economic growth in emerging
markets.
Dividend payments, which consistently rank just
below savings, appear sticky-down, implying that, on aver-
age, firms increase or maintain rather than reduce or cur-
tail the payouts during the financial crisis. This finding of
a sticky-down pattern in dividends is surprising and
unique to our sampled non-utility and non-financial firms
as it is in contrast with results in prior studies. For exam-
ple, Shirai (2004) argues that firms can easily cutback on
dividends to avert bankruptcy as they are not mandatory
like interest and debt repayments. A notable exception is
Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2015) who document similar resil-
ience in dividend payouts during the financial crisis but
only for U.S. banks which use dividends to signal their
profitability and solvency to stakeholders. We attribute the
unique sticky-down pattern for the sampled non-utility
and non-financial firms to the prevalence of information
asymmetry and agency costs in emerging markets that
drive a stubbornly strong signalling motive against deterio-
rating business fundamentals during the financial crisis.
The aforementioned stylized patterns, which are in stark
contrast to those in the U.S. where firms allocate 36% of
operating cash flow to savings, 32% to debt retirements,
23% to investments, 9% to equity repurchases and only 1%
to dividends as reported by Chang et al. (2014). This high-
lights the utilitarian nature of the emerging market con-
text as an independent sample for reconciling and
generalizing findings from developed economies.
Our findings of uniquely low investment-cash flow
sensitivities (cash flow allocations to investments), even
for constrained firms during the financial crisis, show the
poor performance of this commonly used measure of
credit or financial constraints in environments and
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around events where the credit constraints are suppos-
edly more binding. Our results show that investment-
cash flow sensitivities are more linked to under and over-
investment problems than financial constraints per se, as
firms with low (high) sensitivities under-invest (over-
invest). This is in contrast with a strong correlation
between investment and credit constraints in prior litera-
ture (see Almeida & Campello, 2007; Beatty, Liao, &
Weber, 2010; Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Fazzari et al., 1988).
From our further analyses, cash flow sensitivity of cash,
which until recently has received limited coverage,
emerges as a more reliable and informative measure of
credit constraints that correlates significantly with credit
market conditions. These findings signal the need for a
shift in research focus as firms are increasingly investing
in intangible capital and cutting-back on physical or tan-
gible investments.
The allocations of funds to debt retirements and
equity repurchases for our sampled emerging market
firms are comparatively lower and higher, respectively,
than those in the U.S. (see Chang et al., 2014). These dif-
ferences indicate the less-developed nature of the capital
markets in emerging economies. The sampled firms have
approximately 85.4%–86.2% of total assets financed by
equity (high equity dependence) as the emerging bond or
debt markets are still in their infancy (see Mu, Phelps, &
Stotsky, 2013; Shirai, 2004). Further, our results show sig-
nificant interdependence in investment and financing
decisions, which suggests that overlooking this critical
aspect could lead to biased inferences on cash flow
sensitivities.
To check the robustness of our findings, we use the
financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment to examine
how managers allocate funds across competing uses-of-
funds. Again, we find that our main story holds as the
firms in our sample save most of their operating cash
flow and prioritize dividends ahead of other uses-of-
funds. In additional analyses, we find that deviating from
the target cash holdings, investments, dividends and capi-
tal structure has real implications on how firms allocate
funds. Our results further suggest that firms above
(below) the target cash holdings tend to build-up more
cash reserves and allocate less to investments, dividends,
debt retirements and equity repurchases. For the above-
target investment firms, we find the opposite as they save
less, which further confirms the trade-off between sav-
ings and investments in markets where access to external
finance is limited. Also, we find that above-target divi-
dend firms allocate less funds to other uses-of-funds and
that dividends are resilient or stick-down. This finding
points to a strong signalling motive in emerging markets
beleaguered by a prevalence of information asymmetry
and agency costs, and signals the need for policies that
improve information disclosure and access to external
finance.
Our study makes several contributions to the litera-
ture. First, we provide further empirical evidence from a
richer framework that simultaneously models all uses-of-
funds while accounting for the inter-temporal and
interdependent nature of investment and financing deci-
sions. Adopting this approach helps introduce some order
in the rich body of empirical evidence. This is in stark
contrast to the extant studies using a ceteris paribus
approach (piecemeal approach) of focusing on a single
use of funds (e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Chen, Chen,
Schipper, Xu, & Xue, 2012; Guariglia & Yang, 2016;
Moshirian, Nanda, Vadilyev, & Zhang, 2017). Our results
not only confirm the significant interdependence in
investment and financing decisions but also show that
firms simultaneously allocate funds across savings,
investments, dividend payments, debt retirements and
equity repurchases (sources-equal-uses-of-funds). In addi-
tion, we find that deviating from optimal investment and
financing levels have real implications on corporate deci-
sions or outcomes. These findings suggest that estimates
of cash flow sensitivities based on piecemeal approaches
and static models should be interpreted with caution as
they could lead to biased inferences. Second, we show
that firms in emerging markets prioritize savings ahead
of investments and other uses-of-funds, which indicates
limited access to external finance. Third, we show that
the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivity has
declined and that the measure is more linked to under
and over-investment problems rather than financial con-
straints. A substitute in the form of cash flow sensitivity of
cash emerges as a more relevant measure of credit con-
straints that correlates significantly with changes in credit
markets. Fourth, our further analyses show that the signifi-
cant asymmetries in cash flow sensitivity of cash reported
in the literature disappear once negative-cash flow firms are
excluded, this helps shed more light on the mixed empirical
findings in the literature (Almeida et al., 2004; Bao, Chan,
& Zhang, 2012; Machokoto & Areneke, 2020; Riddick &
Whited, 2009). Fifth, we provide new evidence on the sticki-
ness of dividend payouts in emerging markets even during
the financial crisis when business fundamentals deterio-
rated. We attribute the dividend stickiness to the prevalence
of agency costs and information asymmetry in less-devel-
oped capital markets. Sixth, we report a battery of robust-
ness tests aimed at addressing mis-measurement errors
associated with Tobin's q (a proxy of future growth opportu-
nities) and provide meaningful comparisons on the relative
performance of the estimators in a new and unique emerg-
ing market context. Finally, we extend the analyses of
financial constraints on all uses-of-funds to understudied
emerging markets are institutionally different from
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advanced economies, where the literature in concentrated. In
doing so, we provide new empirical evidence from an inde-
pendent and unique emerging market sample that helps to
generalize and reconcile the mixed findings in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a brief background of the context and hypothe-
ses. Section 3 introduces the empirical approach and
describes the data used. Section 4 presents the empirical
findings and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
2 | THE EMERGING-MARKET
CONTEXT AND HYPOTHESES
In the following sub-sections, we present a brief overview
of the relevant contextual issues to this study and the
motivations of our hypotheses.
2.1 | The emerging market context
By way of motivation, we plot two commonly used mea-
sures of financial development (stock market capitaliza-
tion-to-GDP and private debt-to-GDP) for the sampled
countries, and other selected emerging and developed
economies. Figure 1 presents a scatterplot of the average
stock market capitalization-to-GDP (%) and private
credit-to-GDP (%) with the superimposed average GDP
(constant 2010 USD) over the sample period.
Figure 1 shows that most African countries consistently
rank below other emerging and developed economies,
except for South Africa. The scatterplots are in line with Mu
et al. (2013), who find that the African bond markets are
still in their infancy. Similarly, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014)
document a significant influence of non-traditional factors
(e.g., education of the managers, location, legal infrastruc-
ture and location) on financing decisions of firms operating
in less-developed African economies.
The case of South Africa, as depicted in Figure 1, is
unique among several dimensions. The country appears to
have robust stock and bond markets as it is ranked second
only to Switzerland based on stock market capitalization-to-
GDP, and fourth just below the U.S., Japan and UK based
on private debt-to-GDP. Nevertheless, South Africa has
lower levels of GDP per capita relative to the other selected
exemplary emerging and developed economies. This finding
highlights significant disparities, where finance is only
accessible to a few companies and individuals. Our observa-
tion corroborates Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014) who find that,
within South Africa, only a few companies can access for-
mal non-bank financing as most companies either cannot
afford the interest rates charged by banks or fall-short of
the stringent loan requirements imposed by lenders in risky
capital markets (most companies and individuals do not
have the required collateral or credit history).
The low levels of financial development depicted in
Figure 1 for the sampled emerging countries have several
implications on how firms allocate funds. For example,
Oztekin (2015) report significant differences in corporate
debt levels, with South African firms (the only African
country in their sample) having 13% of their total assets
financed by debt. This is comparatively lower than those
in Brazil (27%), Canada (18%), France (23%), Germany
(16%), India (28%), Japan (23%), Singapore (19%), Swit-
zerland (24%), UK (17%) and USA (23%). This limited
access to finance, in particular long-term debt, increases
equity dependence as reported by Mu et al. (2013),
thereby making the payment of dividends a priority for
most emerging market firms. This equity dependence
reinforces the dual role of dividends—as both monitoring
(disciplinary role) and signalling devices—in markets
characterized by a high degree of information asymmetry
and agency costs (see Brav et al., 2005; He et al., 2017;
Iturriaga & Crisóstomo, 2010). For the case of emerging
markets, the disciplinary role of corporate debt is
forfeited, and dividends naturally emerge as the best and
most viable option given that directly policing or moni-
toring managers is not feasible as it is only costly but
fraught with institutional deficiencies that cannot be eas-
ily addressed by investors. The lack of a robust corporate
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FIGURE 1 Financial development and economic growth. The
figure presents a scatter plot of stock market capitalization-to-GDP
(%) and private credit-to-GDP (%) with superimposed average GDP
(constant 2010 USD). The depicted emerging and developed
countries (FIC Codes) are Australia (AUS), Brazil (BRA), Canada
(CAN), China (CHN), Egypt (EGY), France (FRA), Germany
(DEU), India (IND), Ivory Coast (CIV), Japan (JPN), Kenya (KEN),
Morocco (MAR), Nigeria (NGA), Singapore (SGP), South Africa
(ZAF), Switzerland (CHE), Tunisia (TUN), UK (GBR) and USA
(USA). The data is drawn from The World Bank over the period
2000–2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A
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debt market also increases reliance on internal financing
sources such as retained earnings and cash reserves (see
Guariglia & Yang, 2018). This implies a significant focus
on buffering of cash reserves to hedge against future
shortfalls. However, this conservatism (accumulation of
large cash reserves) leads to under-investment problems
as firms can only increase cash reserves by reducing or
postponing current investments.
On the other hand, as access to external finance is
limited in emerging markets, the correlation between
investments and cash flow (investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity) should be much higher as firms rely mostly on
internal capital and are still heavily invested in tangible
or physical capital as noted by Moshirian et al. (2017). In
addition, as most of the corporate borrowings have
shorter maturities and are in the form of bank loans (see
Gwatidzo & Ojah, 2014; Sorge, Zhang, & Koufopoulos,
2017), emerging market firms are likely to commit a sig-
nificant proportion of funds to debt retirements. This
concentration of short-term borrowings not only
increases maturity mismatch and refinancing risks but
could also lead to short-termism, with managers focusing
more on servicing and refinancing debt at the expense of
other strategic or long-term goals.
In summary, a combination of the above unique
peculiarities makes emerging markets a utilitarian con-
text or an independent sample that is akin to a laboratory
setting for reconciling and validating existing theories
and findings from studies in developed economies.
2.2 | Hypotheses
A large body of literature starting with Fazzari et al.
(1988) examines the effects of financial constraints on
real decisions by examining the sensitivity of investment
to cash flow. Firms facing binding financial constraints
tend to rely mostly on internal funds as they have limited
access to external financing sources (see, Almeida &
Campello, 2007; Chen & Chen, 2012; Fazzari et al., 1988;
Moshirian et al., 2017). The limited access to external
finance should lead to high investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity and cash flow sensitivity of cash, with the sensitiv-
ity being more pronounced in emerging economies that
have less-developed institutions relative to other
advanced economies. Also, according to Moshirian et al.
(2017), firms in emerging economies are structurally dif-
ferent from those in advanced economies as they operate
with more physical capital. These high investments in
physical capital should lead to a higher correlation
between investment and operating cash flow for emerg-
ing market firms relative to those reported in the litera-
ture from developed economies.3
At the same time, Almeida et al. (2004), Riddick and
Whited (2009) and Bao et al. (2012) also show that cash
flow sensitivity of cash increases with credit constraints.
Similarly, Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2006) report a
decrease in cash flow sensitivity of cash with financial
development. In addition, Chang et al. (2014) also find
that U.S. firms allocate a high proportion of funds to sav-
ings and debt retirements. In contrast, they find that US
firms allocate less to investment, equity repurchases and
dividends in that order. Lewellen and Lewellen (2016)
documents similar variations in cash flow allocations for
U.S. firms, except that most of the funds are allocated
towards investments rather than savings. The studies
mentioned above point to significant variations in the
allocation of funds across competing uses with credit con-
straints. Therefore, our first hypothesis is stated as
follows:-
Hypothesis 1 (H1) Cash flow sensitivities for cash, divi-
dends and debt retirements are higher and lower for
investments and equity repurchases.
Although there is some emerging consensus that credit
constraints affect corporate decisions, the measurement
and channels or mechanism of this effect is debated. The
mixed results across different measures of financial con-
straints have further compounded the debate. For exam-
ple, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and Chang et al. (2014)
have both cast doubts on the appropriateness of the KZ
Index (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997) as their test return results
that are impulsive and unreliable. Similarly, Chen and
Chen (2012) find no differences in investment-cash flow
sensitivity between supposedly constrained and
unconstrained firms classified based on traditional mea-
sures of credit constraints (size, firm-age, credit ratings,
dividend payouts and corporate governance index). How-
ever, a recent study by Chang et al. (2014) finds significant
differences in cash flow sensitivities based on some of the
above mentioned measures of credit constraints. They find
that constrained firms categorized based on the WW Index
(Whited & Wu, 2006), HP Index (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010),
size, dividend-paying status and credit ratings allocate
most of their funds to savings and equity repurchases, and
less to investments, dividends and debt retirements rela-
tive to their unconstrained counterparts. Lewellen and
Lewellen (2016) report similar differences which are in
stark contrast to Chen et al. (2012) who find no differ-
ences. They attribute the disparities in cash flow sensitivi-
ties, in particular, the low investment-cash flow sensitivity
as reported by Chen et al. (2012), to the use of noisy mea-
sures or proxies of cash flow.
In addition to the debate on the measures of financial
constraints, an emerging tranche of the literature on
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whether cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric or
not reports similarly mixed results. For example, whereas
Almeida et al. (2004), Khurana et al. (2006), Chang et al.
(2014), Lewellen and Lewellen (2016), Grullon, Larkin,
and Michaely (2018) and McLean and Zhao (2018) find a
positive effect of cash flow on changes in cash (the cash
flow sensitivity of cash), Riddick and Whited (2009) and
Bao et al. (2012) find this effect to be negative. They sin-
gle out mis-measurement errors associated with Tobin's q
as the main reason for the differences in cash flow sensi-
tivity of cash. However, their proposed way of addressing
the mis-measurement errors via generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimators based on higher-order
moments is similarly debated as Almeida and Campello
(2007), Chang et al. (2014) and Lewellen and Lewellen
(2016) show that these estimators return economically
impulsive cash flow sensitivities of cash. This mixed evi-
dence leaves the central question of whether financial
constraints affect real decisions open to debate, especially
in emerging markets where the literature is sparse, and
access to external finance is limited. Accordingly, we pro-
pose and test the following hypothesis using several prox-
ies of financial constraints:-
Hypothesis 2 (H2) Cash flow sensitivities are heteroge-
neous or asymmetric and differ across different mea-
sures of financial constraints.
3 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Data
We extract accounting data from Datastream and macro-
economic data from The World Bank database over the
period 2000–2015. Our sample coverage is purely dictated
by data availability. Following the standard convention
in the literature, we drop firms in heavily regulated
financial and utility sectors (Brav, 2009; Flannery &
Rangan, 2006; Oztekin, 2015). We exclude firms with
missing data on key variables. To reduce the com-
pounding effect of outliers or merger and acquisitions,
we drop firms with more than 100% growth in assets or
sales and winsorize all variables used at the lower and
upper one percentile. Our final sample consists of 639
firms with 5,940 firm-year observations from Egypt,
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South
Africa and Tunisia. All variables used are defined in
Appendix A.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics and differences
in cash flow and uses-of-funds conditional on four prox-
ies of financial constraints. Panel A, for the main vari-
ables, shows that the mean (median) of 0.018 (0.008),
0.079 (0.064), 0.054 (0.034), 0.019 (0.000), −0.061
(−0.057), and 0.156 (0.138) for changes in cash (ΔCash),
investments (Capex), dividends (Div), changes in debt
(ΔD), changes in equity (ΔE) and cash flow (CF), respec-
tively. Panel B of Table 1 shows that, on average, con-
strained firms have lower CF, investments (Capex), pay
less in dividends (Div) and retire less debt (ΔD) and rep-
urchase less equity (ΔE). At the same time, constrained
firms save (ΔCash) relatively more than unconstrained
firms. These differences appear to be in line with our
expectations that constrained firms are likely to prioritize
enhancing financing flexibility (ΔCash) ahead of other
uses-of-funds (Capex, Div, ΔD and ΔE).
Table 2 presents the pairwise Spearman (Pearson)
correlations in the above (below) diagonal. The pairwise
correlations show that CF is positively correlated with
changes in cash (ΔCash), investments (Capex) and divi-
dends (Div), while it is negatively correlated with
changes in debt (ΔD) and changes in equity (ΔE). These
correlations are in line with our initial predictions on the
uses-of-funds (CF allocations). Table 2 also shows that
changes in cash (ΔCash) are negatively correlated with
investments (Capex) and dividends (Div), which suggests
that firms build-up cash reserves by forgoing investments
and curtailing dividend payments. The correlations of the
other control variables are consistent with the literature,
and for brevity, we only further discuss key variables of
interest.
3.2 | Methodology
To examine CF sensitivities, we follow Gatchev et al.
(2010) and simultaneously estimate the following system
of equations:
ΔCashijt
Capexijt
Divijt
ΔDijt
ΔEijt
2
666666664
3
777777775
=L CFijt
 
+K
ΔCashijt−1
Capexijt−1
Divijt−1
ΔDijt−1
ΔEijt−1
2
666666664
3
777777775
+M
qijt−1
SGiJt−1
Sizeijt−1
PPEijt−1
2
666664
3
777775
+
ϵΔCashijt
ϵCapexijt
ϵDivijt
ϵΔDijt
ϵΔEijt
2
6666666664
3
7777777775
ð1Þ
where ΔCashijt, Capexijt, Divijt, ΔDijt and ΔEijt are the
changes in cash, investments, dividends, changes in debt
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TABLE 1 Basic statistics
Panel A: Main variables
# Variables N Mean SD Min p25 Median p75 Max Trend
(1) ΔCash 5,940 0.018 0.079 −0.394 −0.019 0.008 0.047 0.679 −0.021
(2) Capex 5,940 0.079 0.063 0.000 0.035 0.064 0.107 0.529 −0.156***
(3) Div 5,940 0.054 0.067 0.000 0.013 0.034 0.070 0.730 0.085**
(4) ΔD 5,940 0.019 0.084 −0.525 −0.016 0.000 0.045 0.802 0.145***
(5) ΔE 5,940 −0.061 0.110 −0.795 −0.102 −0.057 −0.020 0.732 0.157***
(6) CF 5,940 0.156 0.100 0.000 0.085 0.138 0.208 0.703 −0.299***
(7) q 5,940 1.727 1.155 0.284 1.090 1.459 2.060 50.535 3.420***
(8) SG 5,940 0.126 0.188 −0.496 0.034 0.110 0.203 0.976 −0.832***
(9) Size 5,940 15.255 1.974 8.039 13.817 15.455 16.671 19.294 4.925***
(10) PPE 5,940 0.364 0.222 0.009 0.171 0.331 0.546 0.977 −0.009
(11) WW 5,940 −0.734 0.096 −0.991 −0.801 −0.748 −0.666 −0.370 −0.227***
(12) HP 5,940 −11.497 0.943 −12.369 −12.135 −12.079 −10.989 −6.765 −3.283***
(13) LogAge 5,940 2.436 0.516 1.099 2.079 2.485 2.833 3.258 8.511***
Panel B: Differences across sub-samples
Variables CF ΔCash Capex Div ΔDebt ΔEquity
FC Category Metric (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WW Low Mean 0.156 0.012 0.086 0.062 0.025 −0.068
Median 0.137 0.005 0.074 0.038 0.004 −0.061
High Mean 0.157 0.025 0.072 0.047 0.012 −0.054
Median 0.141 0.012 0.056 0.029 0.000 −0.053
Diff p-value Mean [0.767] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Median [0.027] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
HP Low Mean 0.152 0.013 0.086 0.058 0.027 −0.062
Median 0.134 0.005 0.074 0.035 0.006 −0.059
High Mean 0.162 0.024 0.070 0.050 0.008 −0.060
Median 0.147 0.012 0.053 0.031 0.000 −0.054
Diff p-value Mean [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.525]
Median [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.003]
Size Low Mean 0.169 0.022 0.073 0.058 0.010 −0.066
Median 0.153 0.011 0.056 0.035 0.000 −0.058
High Mean 0.143 0.013 0.086 0.050 0.028 −0.056
Median 0.125 0.005 0.074 0.031 0.008 −0.057
Diff p-value Mean [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Median [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.000] [0.468]
LogAge Low Mean 0.165 0.023 0.076 0.053 0.015 −0.059
Median 0.147 0.010 0.059 0.033 0.000 −0.056
High Mean 0.145 0.012 0.083 0.056 0.024 −0.064
Median 0.128 0.005 0.071 0.035 0.007 −0.059
Diff p-value Mean [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.104] [0.000] [0.129]
Median [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.095] [0.000] [0.002]
Crisis Pre-crisis Mean 0.168 0.024 0.084 0.054 0.018 −0.071
Median 0.147 0.010 0.065 0.034 0.000 −0.067
(Continues)
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and changes in equity, respectively, for firm i in country j
at time t; L, K and M are matrices of parameter coeffi-
cients of size 5 × 1, 5 × 5, 5 × 4, respectively; CFijt is
cash flow and the control variables are; qijt − 1 is lagged
market-to-book value, SGiJt − 1 is lagged sales growth,
Sizeijt − 1 is the lagged logarithm of total assets, and
PPEijt − 1 is lagged property, plant and equipment; and,
ϵΔCashijt , ϵ
Capex
ijt , ϵDivijt , ϵΔDijt and ϵΔEijt are the error terms. The
literature informs the choice of control variables (e.g.,
Almeida et al., 2004; Chang et al., 2014; Chen & Chen,
2012; Gatchev et al., 2010). The sources-equal-uses-of-
funds or adding-up constraint (CF should equal the
uses-of-funds) requires that i'L = 1, i'K= 0
1× 5
and I
am= 0
1× 4
(see Gatchev et al., 2010). The adding-up con-
straint will naturally be satisfied if there are no income
items that have been directly reported in total equity
instead of the income statement (a practice commonly
known as “dirty-surplus accounting” [see Chang et al.,
2014; Lewellen & Lewellen, 2016]).
To study the impact of financial constraints on CF
sensitivities, we split the sample based on the WW
Index (WW) (Whited & Wu, 2006), HP Index (HP)
(Hadlock & Pierce, 2010), firm-size (Size) and firm-age
(LogAge).4 In each year for each country, we categorize
firms as being constrained (unconstrained) if they are
below (above) the median firm-size and firm-age, and
unconstrained (constrained) if they are below (above)
the median of the WW Index and HP Index. Other
extant studies use different categorization or classifica-
tion schemes such as the upper and lower terciles or
quantiles of the distribution to study asymmetry in CF
sensitivities (see Almeida et al., 2004; Almeida, Hsu, &
Li, 2013; Almeida & Philippon, 2007; Bao et al., 2012;
Chen et al., 2012). As using these schemes increase the
likelihood of finding differences, we contend that using
the median is a more conservative approach and pref-
erable, especially in cases where the sample size is
small, or the distribution of the data is skewed. We,
however, take comfort in that our untabulated results
based on the upper and lower terciles or quantiles clas-
sification schemes do not materially differ from the
main findings.
We estimate our models simultaneously using seem-
ingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in line with recent lit-
erature (see Andres, Cumming, Karabiber, & Schweizer,
2014; Chang et al., 2014; Gatchev et al., 2010; Gatchev,
Spindt, & Tarhan, 2009). Using this framework enables
us to simultaneously account for both the
interdependence and inter-temporal nature of invest-
ment and financing decisions, and also the sources-
equal-uses-of-funds or adding-up constraint (CF should
equal the uses-of-funds). As argued by Gatchev et al.
(2010), overlooking the inter-temporal and
interdependent nature of corporate investment and
financing decisions could lead to bias inferences on CF
sensitivities. However, for robustness and to ensure
comparability with prior studies, we also present results
based on the equation-by-equation approach (separately
estimated equations). Specifically, we also estimate our
models using ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Panel B: Differences across sub-samples
Variables CF ΔCash Capex Div ΔDebt ΔEquity
Crisis Mean 0.155 0.013 0.079 0.059 0.013 −0.062
Median 0.139 0.005 0.064 0.038 0.000 −0.058
Diff p-value Mean [0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.016] [0.045] [0.010]
Median [0.005] [0.001] [0.533] [0.012] [0.652] [0.000]
Countries Others Mean 0.174 0.012 0.079 0.083 0.011 −0.073
Median 0.154 0.005 0.057 0.063 0.000 −0.067
South Africa Mean 0.152 0.019 0.079 0.048 0.021 −0.058
Median 0.136 0.008 0.065 0.030 0.001 −0.056
Diff p-value Mean [0.000] [0.003] [0.975] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Median [0.000] [0.100] [0.023] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: The table presents the summary statistics of the variables used. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in
selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2000–2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are win-
sorized at the lower and upper one percentiles. * * *, * *, * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 % levels, respectively.
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(FE), the higher-order moments estimator of Erickson
and Whited (2000, 2002) (GMM3–GMM5), instrumental
variables 2SLS (IV-2SLS) (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman,
2008), instrumental variables GMM (IV-GMM) (Baum
et al., 2008; Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003), differ-
ence general method of moments (DIFF-GMM)
(Arellano & Bond, 1991), system general method of
moments (SYS-GMM) (Blundell & Bond, 1998) and
Panel Vector Autoregression models (PVAR) (Abrigo &
Love, 2016). The latter methods use higher-order
moments or instrumental variables to address mis-mea-
surement errors associated with Tobin's q, a proxy of
future growth opportunities.5
4 | RESULTS
In this section, we first estimate a system of equations
with and without the sources-equal-uses-of-funds
(adding-up) constraint to understand how firms allocate
operating CF. Next, we examine the effects of financial
constraints on CF sensitivities conditional on several
commonly used proxies of financial constraints. We then
use the financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment to
better understand this effect during significant contrac-
tions in credit supply. Finally, we present a battery of
robustness tests aimed at addressing several problems
surrounding the study of CF sensitivities.
TABLE 2 Correlations
# Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) ΔCash 1 −0.103*** −0.037*** 0.019 0.160*** 0.314*** −0.017 0.068***
(2) Capex −0.093*** 1 0.049*** 0.235*** −0.026** 0.285*** 0.199*** 0.088***
(3) Div −0.052*** 0.079*** 1 0.055*** −0.526*** 0.469*** 0.581*** 0.059***
(4) ΔD 0.080*** 0.262*** 0.067*** 1 0.030** −0.110*** 0.146*** 0.088***
(5) ΔE 0.199*** −0.036*** −0.522*** −0.043*** 1 −0.306*** −0.307*** −0.044***
(6) CF 0.319*** 0.300*** 0.573*** −0.036*** −0.290*** 1 0.429*** 0.175***
(7) q 0.033** 0.143*** 0.472*** 0.120*** −0.187*** 0.381*** 1 0.167***
(8) SG 0.071*** 0.117*** 0.083*** 0.075*** −0.030** 0.197*** 0.087*** 1
(9) Size −0.096*** 0.127*** −0.004 0.076*** 0.013 −0.071*** 0.063*** −0.031**
(10) PPE −0.049*** 0.393*** −0.041*** −0.014 0.026** 0.060*** −0.025* −0.061***
(11) WW 0.087*** −0.134*** −0.116*** −0.083*** 0.039*** −0.008 −0.125*** 0.042***
(12) HP 0.054*** −0.096*** −0.049*** −0.107*** 0.014 0.047*** −0.079*** 0.021
(13) LogAge −0.043*** −0.008 −0.048*** 0.076*** 0.062*** −0.158*** 0.027** −0.150***
# Variables (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) ΔCash −0.108*** −0.047*** 0.102*** 0.061*** −0.048***
(2) Capex 0.200*** 0.448*** −0.199*** −0.188*** 0.059***
(3) Div −0.014 −0.097*** −0.142*** −0.052*** −0.039***
(4) ΔD 0.099*** 0.000 −0.097*** −0.139*** 0.105***
(5) ΔE 0.051*** 0.083*** 0.026** −0.019 0.097***
(6) CF −0.094*** 0.055*** 0.009 0.062*** −0.159***
(7) q 0.129*** −0.081*** −0.201*** −0.167*** 0.107***
(8) SG −0.034*** −0.084*** 0.032** 0.051*** −0.134***
(9) Size 1 0.278*** −0.950*** −0.850*** 0.445***
(10) PPE 0.253*** 1 −0.255*** −0.184*** 0.089***
(11) WW −0.944*** −0.240*** 1 0.821*** −0.428***
(12) HP −0.899*** −0.165*** 0.862*** 1 −0.462***
(13) LogAge 0.425*** 0.069*** −0.410*** −0.456*** 1
Notes: The table presents the pairwise Spearman (Pearson) correlations in the above (below) diagonal. The sample consists of listed non-util-
ity and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2000–2015. All variables used are defined in
Appendix A and are winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles. * * *, * *, * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 % levels,
respectively.
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4.1 | The investment and financing-CF
sensitivities
Table 3 presents the estimation results of a system of
equations depicted by Equation (1) that relate the uses-
of-funds to CF and several control variables. Columns
(1)–(5) and (6)–(10) present estimation results for models
without and with the sources-equal-uses-of-funds
(adding-up) constraint, respectively.
Columns (1)–(5) of Table 3, for estimates of CF sensi-
tivities based on models without the sources-equal-uses-
of-funds constraint, show that firms allocate most of the
internally generated CF to savings (43.8%), followed by
dividends (17.7%), debt (13.6%), equity (10.2%) and
investments (8.4%) in that order. The results show that,
on average, a firm increases savings by 2.97%, and reduce
debt by 1.14%, while paying 1.13% in dividends, and at
the same time allocating 0.87% to equity repurchases,
and only investing 0.57% for a one SD increase in operat-
ing CF. This pecking order in CF allocations is consistent
with our first hypothesis. It also shows that emerging
market firms are subject to significant credit constraints
as the allocations to savings are 5.2 times higher than
those to investments (Capex). The results are in stark
contrast to Chang et al. (2014), who find that U.S. firms
allocate 28% and 33% of operating CF to investments and
savings, respectively.
Columns (1)–(5) further show that investment and
financing decisions are inter-temporal and
interdependent as the coefficients of the lagged uses-of-
funds (ΔCash, Capex, Div, ΔD and ΔE) are significant.
Our untabulated results, when we exclude the lagged
uses-of-funds, further confirm the bias in the estimates of
CF sensitivities based on models that overlook the inter-
temporal and interdependent nature of investment and
financing decisions. The estimates from these models
return comparably higher CF allocations to equity pur-
chases and dividend payments and lower allocations to
savings, investments and debt retirements. Our further
analyses using an equation-by-equation approach con-
firms this bias and emphasize the need to account for the
inter-temporal and interdependent nature of corporate
decisions.
The estimates of CF sensitivities based on models
with the sources-equal-uses-of-funds (adding-up) con-
straint, in Columns (6)–(10), are similar to those in Col-
umns (1)–(5) based on models estimated without the
adding-up constraint. This finding suggests that our
results are robust to the critique that CF sensitivities
which are not estimated simultaneously and without
explicitly imposing the adding-up constraint lead to
biased inferences (see Gatchev et al., 2010). Instead, our
results corroborate Chang et al. (2014) and Lewellen and
Lewellen (2016) who argue that if variables are consis-
tently defined in the absence of “dirty-surplus account-
ing” (a practice of directly reporting income items in total
equity rather than the income statement—this is akin to
by-passing the income statement), the adding-up con-
straint will naturally be satisfied. However, in contrast to
the aforementioned studies, Columns (6)–(10) show
lower allocations to investments (Capex) and equity
repurchases (ΔE), and higher allocations to savings, divi-
dends and debt retirements (except for Chang et al.
(2014) who report CF allocations of 32% to debt retire-
ments in the U.S.). The differences indicate the cautious
investment approaches of firms that operate in environ-
ments where access to external finance is limited. At the
same time, enhancing financial flexibility by building
substantial cash reserves and signalling to the market by
pre-committing to pay dividends appear to be more press-
ing goals for firms in emerging markets relative to those
in developed economies.
In summary, our estimates of CF sensitivities reveal
several noteworthy patterns; (1) the high allocations to
savings and dividends suggest two primary motives—the
need to enhance financial flexibility through buffering
cash reserves when access to external finance is limited,
and at the same, pre-committing to paying dividends as a
way of reducing information asymmetry and agency
costs, and (2) a high reliance on short-term debt or short-
term debt dependence as evidenced by the significantly
higher CF allocations to debt retirements, (3) low-equity
repurchases (which indicate equity dependence)
highlighting the less-developed nature of the capital mar-
kets, and (4) under-investment problems as evidenced by
the significantly lower allocation of funds to investments.
Although the above results reveal unique insights into
how firms allocate operating CF, they are limiting as the
linear models used implicitly assume homogeneity in CF
sensitivities. Yet, theory and anecdotal evidence point to
significant asymmetry or heterogeneity in investment
and financing decisions.
4.2 | The effects of financial constraints
on CF sensitivities
We next explore the impact of financial constraints on
investment and financing decisions by comparing CF
sensitivities or allocations between constrained and
unconstrained firms. We categorize or classify firms into
the low (high) regime if they are below (above) the
median of the WW Index (WW), HP Index (HP), firm-
size (Size) and firm-age (LogAge) in each year for each
country. Table 4 summarizes the results for the sub-
samples.
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Column (1) of Table 4 shows that constrained firms
(high-WW, high-HP, small and young firms) save 50%–
60% more than their unconstrained counterparts (low-
WW, low-HP, large and mature firms). The asymmetric
CF allocations to savings conditional on financial con-
straints are in line with our second hypothesis (Hypothe-
sis 2) and consistent but higher than those reported by
Chang et al. (2014) in the U.S. (of between 35% and 38%).
This propensity to save as popularized by Almeida et al.
(2004), Riddick and Whited (2009) and Bao et al. (2012),
which is higher in our case of emerging market firms,
indicate the primacy of maintaining or enhancing finan-
cial flexibility through holding substantial cash reserves.
This finding is line with Almeida et al. (2004) and sug-
gests that holding vast cash reserves is particularly impor-
tant when access to external finance is likely to be more
uncertain given the firm's current financial position (as
would be the case for constrained firms) and its operating
environment. As argued by Guariglia and Yang (2018) for
the case of Chinese firms, firms operating in emerging
markets that are characterized by limited access to exter-
nal finance tend to rely mostly on self-financing sources
(retained earnings and cash holdings). The need to hedge
against future shortfalls explains the high propensity to
save that we document in an environment beleaguered
by institutional voids.
As shown in Column (2), our sampled firms only allo-
cate 8.4% of the funds to investments. This allocation is
much lower than expected and those reported by Chang
et al. (2014) and Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) of 23%
and 26%, respectively. The differences are somewhat sur-
prising as emerging market firms are still heavily
invested in physical capital and have limited access to
external finance (Moshirian et al., 2017), which should
result in higher investment-CF sensitivities (allocations
of CF to investments) relative to developed economies.
To the extent that emerging markets offer a unique and
independent sample, our contrasting findings further
TABLE 4 The effect of credit
constraints on investment and
financing-cash flow sensitivities
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
FC Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WW index CFLow 0.351*** 0.106*** 0.254*** −0.135*** −0.154***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
CFHigh 0.540*** 0.064*** 0.099*** −0.191*** −0.106***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Diff p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.006]
HP index CFLow 0.358*** 0.115*** 0.241*** −0.172*** −0.115***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
CFHigh 0.554*** 0.047*** 0.090*** −0.156*** −0.153***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Diff p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.402] [0.026]
Size CFLow 0.514*** 0.053*** 0.145*** −0.134*** −0.155***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
CFHigh 0.348*** 0.122*** 0.226*** −0.188*** −0.115***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
Diff p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.024]
LogAge CFLow 0.533*** 0.061*** 0.108*** −0.212*** −0.085***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
CFHigh 0.340*** 0.124*** 0.268*** −0.068*** −0.200***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012)
Diff p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: The table presents the estimation results of a system of equations depicted by Equation (1)
relating the uses-of-funds to cash flow and firm characteristics. All models include control vari-
ables and the lagged use of funds (but not reported). The correlation of residuals across the sys-
tem of equations is not reported for brevity. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-
financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2000–2015.
All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorized at the lower and upper one
percentiles. * * *, * *, * indicate significance at the one, five, and 10 % levels, respectively.
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corroborate Chen et al. (2012) who report decreases in
investment-cash flow sensitivity even during the financial
crisis when credit constraints were supposedly more
binding. Based on this finding, we, therefore, conclude
that investment-CF sensitivities are not good proxies for
financial constraints as they are lower rather than higher
for emerging market firms that are more subject to bind-
ing credit constraints.
Column (3) shows that allocations of funds to divi-
dend payments are similarly asymmetric and consistently
lower for financially constrained relative to
unconstrained firms. These results are in line with the
asymmetric savings and investment behaviour we
observed in Columns (1) and (2), which suggest that
financially constrained firms prioritize enhancing finan-
cial flexibility ahead of investments and would similarly,
as in Column (3), not pay much in dividends. The find-
ings prevail despite the central role of dividends as signal-
ling devices for firms operating in emerging markets that
are characterized by a high degree of information asym-
metry. We put forth two reasons why the sampled firms
would allocate lower proportions of operating CF to divi-
dend payments: (1) constrained firms being less-profit-
able have less to payout and would not pre-commit to
dividends they cannot sustain, and (2) the few profitable
firms would instead save rather than spend as future
income-flows are highly uncertain. This conservatism
arises due to the considerable wedge between internal
and external costs of funds in emerging markets which
reinforces the propensity to save rather than spend. Thus,
only unconstrained firms with better prospects or future
growth opportunities allocate a significant portion of
operating CF to dividend payments as a way of signalling
their quality, and in the process, reduce information
asymmetry and improve access to external finance.
Next, we explore the CF allocations to debt retire-
ments and equity repurchases for which the relevant lit-
erature is sparse, especially in emerging economies with
less-developed capital markets. Columns (4) and (5) show
mixed evidence across the four proxies of financial con-
straints as we find that financially constrained
(unconstrained) firms based on the WW Index and firms-
age (HP Index and firm-size) allocate a higher (lower)
proportion of operating CF to debt retirements. We find
similarly mixed results on equity repurchases, in Column
(5), with firms identified as unconstrained (constrained)
based on the WW Index and firms-age (HP Index and
firm-size) repurchasing more (less) equity than con-
strained (unconstrained) firms. In this instance, it is not
clear why the results based on the WW Index and firms-
age (LogAge) categorization or classification schemes are
opposite those based on HP Index and firm-size (Size).
This situation obtains despite the significant positive
Spearman (Pearson) correlation of 0.862 (0.821) between
the WW and HP Index in Table 2. The mixed results not
only highlight the difficulties encountered when
attempting to measure or study the impact of credit con-
straints on corporate decisions, but also the need for fur-
ther theoretical frameworks or models. These extensions
would inform the empiricist about the underlying chan-
nels or mechanisms through which credit constraints
affect real decisions.
Overall, our results suggest that financial constraints
significantly affect the allocation of funds and that the
propensity to save (maintaining or enhancing financial
flexibility) positively correlates with credit constraints. At
the same time, binding financial constraints are more
likely to result in lower rather than higher investment-
CF sensitivity. This observation is new and important to
the literature as it helps reconcile the mixed empirical
findings on investment-CF sensitivity. We argue that
using a system of equations offer a better framework to
study the impact of financial constraints, especially, in
emerging markets where the inter-temporal and indepen-
dent nature of investment and financing decisions is
more apparent with limited access to external finance.
4.3 | The effects of financial constraints
on CF sensitivities through the financial
crisis
Building on the results in the previous section, we next
use the financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment to
examine whether CF sensitivities vary with credit con-
straints before and during the 2008–09 contractions in
credit supply. Table 5 summarizes the results for the pre-
crisis (Before) and crisis (After) periods.
Table 5 reveals several noteworthy changes in CF sen-
sitivities around the financial crisis. The average sampled
firm appears not to alter its savings around the financial
crisis, but instead, significantly increase CF allocations to
investments and dividend payments. The increased allo-
cations to investments, investment-CF sensitivity, is as
expected and in line with the mainstream literature
which finds that, when faced with binding credit con-
straints, firms increasingly rely on internal financing
sources (operating CF) (see Fazzari, Hubbard, &
Petersen, 2000; Guariglia & Yang, 2016). However, this
increase in the correlation between investments and CF
is inconsistent with Chen and Chen (2012) and
Machokoto, Tanveer, Ishaq, and Areneke (2019) who
document a marked decrease in investment-CF sensitiv-
ity in the U.S. and UK, respectively, for both constrained
and unconstrained firms around the financial crisis. Our
results differ from the two aforementioned studies
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because emerging market firms are still heavily invested
in physical or tangible capital and heavily reliant on
internal capital sources, especially during contractions in
credit supply, as the capital markets are comparatively
less-developed.
Columns (3) and (8), for all firms, show a 26%
increase in CF allocations to dividend payments from
0.142 in the pre-crisis period to 0.179 during the financial
crisis. This increase is significant at 1% level and surpris-
ing as firms had to contend with binding credit con-
straints during the financial crisis (as evidenced by an 8%
decrease in CF for our sample firms). At the same time,
we also find a 6% and 44% curtailment in CF allocations
to debt retirements and equity repurchases, respectively.
However, the decrease is only significant for equity
repurchases and not debt retirements, which similarly
shows the over-reliance on equity finance in emerging
markets. Our untabulated results further show that cor-
porate debt marginally increased from 13.8% to 14.6%
over the crisis period, which explains why we observe an
insignificant decrease in debt retirements. This equity
dependence, which ranges between 85.4%–86.2% of total
assets, is synonymous with the less-developed nature of
emerging capital markets (see Mu et al., 2013). Put differ-
ently, the insignificant changes in CF allocations to debt
retirements could also point to difficulties in servicing
debt, which is likely to be more problematic in emerging
markets where most of the borrowings are in the form of
bank loans with short maturities.6
Next, we study the differences in CF allocations
between constrained and unconstrained firms around the
financial crisis. As the financial crisis was primarily an
exogenous credit supply shock that originated in the U.S.
sub-prime mortgage crisis, we contend that this set-up
resembles a quasi-natural experiment where the credit
supply shock is reliably orthogonal to local investment
and financing opportunities (see Chari, Christiano, &
Kehoe, 2008; Popov & Rocholl, 2018). Hence, any
changes that we observe or document around the finan-
cial crisis, in Table 5, are less likely to result from other
confounding or feedback effects.
Our analyses around the financial crisis reveal several
stylized changes and heterogeneity in CF allocations.
Table 5 shows that unconstrained firms significantly
increased savings while their constrained counterparts
reduced allocations to savings. The decrease in savings
for credit-constrained firms mirrors the decline in CF
during the financial crisis and point to a diversion of
funds towards protecting or smoothing investments. For
the changes in CF allocations to investments, we only
find a significant increase for unconstrained firms with
their constrained counterparts experiencing an insignifi-
cant or muted change. This finding is in line with TableT
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4, and further shows that investment-CF sensitivity is
increasingly becoming an unreliable measure of credit
constraints.
Our sampled non-utility and non-financial firms signifi-
cantly increased dividends during the financial crisis, except
for large firms that can more easily dispense with the need to
signal their quality using dividends. In line with the results
in Tables 1 and 4, the increased allocation of funds to divi-
dend payments for the other firm sub-groups (excluding
large firms) highlights the central role of dividends as moni-
toring and signalling devices in emerging markets. As emerg-
ing markets are characterized by a high degree of
information asymmetry and agency costs, dividends are the
only available and viable monitoring and signalling
devices given that debt is inaccessible and directly polic-
ing managers is not only costly but also fraught with
institutional deficiencies. These unique aspects of
emerging markets are behind the stickiness and resil-
ience in dividend payouts we have so far documented.
The finding is similar to Floyd et al. (2015) who docu-
ment significant resilience in dividends around the
financial crisis in the U.S. but only for banks that use
the payouts to signal their profitability and solvency to
key stakeholders. For our sampled firms, which are
non-utility and non-financial firms, dividends assume a
dual role of signalling to investors and disciplining man-
agers by preventing the misuse of free-CF given that the
governance structures in emerging markets are less-
developed.
For the dynamics in CF allocations to debt retire-
ments, we find similarly mixed and inconclusive results
as those we tabulated in the previous section across dif-
ferent proxies of financial constraints. These findings
indicate that the existing measures of credit constraints
do not always lead to the same conclusions in different
contexts, which calls for the development of context-spe-
cific proxies. Our final set of results show significant and
consistent decreases in funds allocated to equity
repurchases, with the reductions being more pronounced
for unconstrained firms that are less equity-dependent
and have better access to capital markets. This finding is
in line with our expectations and Wesson, Bruwer, and
Hamman (2015) who find similarly low levels of equity
repurchases which were only allowed much later on in
South Africa (from July 1, 1999 onwards). Our results sug-
gest that the emerging share repurchases market is still in
its infancy owing to several institutional deficiencies. The
deficiencies take the form of rigid announcement require-
ments, non-cancellation of own shares repurchased, and
inconsistencies in both the tax treatment and application
of regulatory rules as noted by Wesson et al. (2015) in the
exemplary case of South Africa that dominates our sam-
pled emerging market countries.
Taken together, our analyses around the 2008–09
credit supply shock suggest that credit constraints have a
significant effect on both investment and financing deci-
sions in emerging markets. Our results further show the
increasing unreliability of investment-CF sensitivity as a
measure of financial constraints, with the CF sensitivity
of cash (the propensity to save) emerging as a more reli-
able proxy of credit constraints that correlates closely
with underlying or prevailing credit market conditions.
4.4 | Deviations from target and non-
linearities in CF sensitivities
In this final part of our study, we examine non-linearities
in CF sensitivities and how deviations from the target—
that is being below or above the median lagged cash
holdings, investments, dividends, debt, equity capital and
CF—affect the allocation of funds. Table 6 summarizes
the estimation results for our additional analyses.
Columns (1)–(5) of Table 6 show that firms with cash
holdings (Cash) above (below) the median seem to build-
up more (less) savings, allocate less (more) to investments,
dividends, debt retirements and equity repurchases. This
accumulation of cash reserves as shown by the lower allo-
cations to investments in Column (2) entails cutting back
or postponing current investments, which are critical for
firm-growth, and consequently, employment and eco-
nomic growth in emerging markets. For sub-samples
based on investments (Capex), we find that firms below
(above) the median allocate relatively more (less) funds to
savings and debt retirements. In contrast, they allocate less
(more) to investments, dividends and equity repurchases.
This allocation of funds is in line with Table 4 and sug-
gests that firms under-invest due to binding credit con-
straints. As our previous results show, Columns (1)–(5)
(for below-target investment firms) also suggest that con-
strained firms attempt to hedge against future shortfalls by
increasing savings and further cutting-back on current
investments. On the other hand, firms that over-invest
(above-target investment firms) save less, pay more divi-
dends and have higher investment-CF sensitivity, which
are all features associated with unconstrained firms rather
than constrained ones as popularized in the literature (see
Beatty et al., 2010; Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Fazzari et al.,
1988). These differences further buttress our earlier find-
ings that CF sensitivity cash (investment-CF sensitivity) is
becoming a more (less) reliable proxy of credit constraints.
Table 6 also shows that firms with above-median divi-
dend payments allocate fewer funds to other uses-of-
funds, except for dividend payments. This finding, which
is further supported by the decrease in dividends with
firm-growth, suggests that dividends are important and
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TABLE 6 The effects of deviating from the target and non-linearities in cash flow sensitivities
Panel A: The effects of deviating from the target
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
Proxy Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash CFBelow 0.295*** 0.120*** 0.193*** −0.195*** −0.198***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013)
CFAbove 0.546*** 0.057*** 0.166*** −0.137*** −0.095***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Diff p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.002] [0.000]
Capex CFBelow 0.525*** 0.030*** 0.126*** −0.217*** −0.102***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014)
CFAbove 0.390*** 0.123*** 0.209*** −0.103*** −0.175***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.011)
Diff p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Dividends CFBelow 0.487*** 0.115*** 0.072*** −0.193*** −0.133***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013)
CFAbove 0.434*** 0.063*** 0.226*** −0.153*** −0.123***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012)
Diff p-value [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.033] [0.602]
Debt CFBelow 0.528*** 0.066*** 0.173*** −0.121*** −0.112***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
CFAbove 0.301*** 0.115*** 0.182*** −0.223*** −0.179***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.017) (0.015)
Diff p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.282] [0.000] [0.000]
Equity CFBelow 0.425*** 0.105*** 0.128*** −0.206*** −0.136***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014)
CFAbove 0.468*** 0.060*** 0.215*** −0.136*** −0.121***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Diff p-value [0.015] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.370]
CF CFBelow 0.417*** 0.093*** 0.113*** −0.204*** −0.173***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.015) (0.013)
CFAbove 0.484*** 0.075*** 0.199*** −0.131*** −0.111***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Diff p-value [0.000] [0.094] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Panel B: Non-linearities in the cash flow sensitivities (CF > 0)
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
Models Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
without constraints CF 0.511*** 0.115*** 0.012 −0.100*** 0.028
(0.037) (0.020) (0.018) (0.039) (0.046)
CF2 −0.043 −0.028 0.237*** 0.059* −0.185***
(0.035) (0.019) (0.017) (0.036) (0.043)
N 2,830 2,830 2,830 2,830 2,830
R2 0.196 0.175 0.382 0.059 0.066
With constraints CF 0.541*** 0.117*** 0.048*** −0.168*** −0.125***
(Continues)
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relatively sticky in the presence of a high degree of infor-
mation asymmetry and agency costs. This finding is in
line with several other studies documenting a significant
effect of capital market development on corporate financ-
ing decisions (see Brown et al., 2013; Sorge et al., 2017).
We further find that deviating from target debt signifi-
cantly affects investment and financing decisions as firms
with above (below) target debt allocate relatively more
(less) to other uses-of-funds, except for savings. This way
of allocating funds further perpetuates the under-invest
problem that we observed for constrained firms in Table
4, especially within the Africa context where most of the
corporate borrowings are in the form of bank loans with
shorter maturities (see Gwatidzo & Ojah, 2014).
On the other hand, the high investments for above-
target-debt firms could signal over-investment issues
associated with the conflict of interest between share-
holders and creditors (agency problems) as noted by
Khémiri and Noubbigh (2019). We also find that equity-
dependent firms accumulate more cash reserves, invest
less and pay more in debt. At the same time, they retire
and repurchase less debt and equity, respectively.
Our further analyses based on CF in Columns (1)–(5) of
Table 6 (Panel A), which are motivated by the debate on
whether CF sensitivity of cash is asymmetric (see Almeida
et al., 2004; Bao et al., 2012; Machokoto & Areneke, 2020;
Riddick & Whited, 2009), show that above-target firms allo-
cate most funds to savings, investments and dividends.
These firms also use some of the new funds to retire debt
and repurchase equity. In Panel B, for our restricted sample
of positive-cash flow firms (CF > 0), we find significant
asymmetries on dividends, debt retirements and equity
repurchases, but not on savings and investments. This new
finding, which is free from biases associated with ad-hoc or
ex-ante sample splitting approaches in the literature, sug-
gests that negative-CF mostly drive the asymmetry reported
by Riddick and Whited (2009) and Bao et al. (2012) on CF
sensitivity of cash as we do not find evidence of dis-savings
even at very low levels of operating CF. The finding high-
lights a high propensity to save that does not appear wane
with increases in operating CF against a backdrop of lim-
ited access to external finance.
To summarize, as our findings suggest that binding
credit constraints affect investment and financing decisions,
they signal the need to hasten the implementation of pro-
capital market development policies in emerging markets.
4.5 | Robustness
In this section, we implement a battery of robustness
tests. First, we re-estimate our main models using several
alternative techniques to facilitate comparisons with
prior studies. Using different estimators enable us to
gauge or assess the sensitivity of our results to mis-mea-
surement errors associated with Tobin's q (a proxy for
future growth opportunities) that could bias our infer-
ences (see Erickson & Whited, 2000, 2002; Riddick &
Whited, 2009). Table 7 summarizes the estimation results
using several alternative techniques (for brevity, we only
report the coefficients of CF and Tobin's q).
Our estimation results of the modified version of
Equation (1), excluding the lagged independent variables,
using an equation-by-equation approach via pooled OLS
and ordinary least squares with FE appear reasonable
and closer to satisfying the sources-equal-uses-of-funds
constraint. The OLS and FE estimates show that firms in
emerging markets, as exemplified by the eight sampled
countries, have higher CF sensitivity of cash (ΔCash) and
CF sensitivity of dividends (Div). In comparison, they
have lower investment-CF sensitivity (Capex). On overall,
the estimates based on OLS and FE are consistent with
TABLE 6 (Continued)
Panel B: Non-linearities in the cash flow sensitivities (CF > 0)
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
(0.037) (0.020) (0.017) (0.036) (0.034)
CF2 0.031 −0.022 0.325*** −0.107*** −0.558***
(0.034) (0.019) (0.016) (0.034) (0.032)
N 2,830 2,830 2,830 2,830 2,830
R2 0.190 0.175 0.355 0.026 0.048
Note: The table presents the estimation results of a system of equations depicted by Equation (1) relating the uses-of-funds to cash flow and
firm characteristics. All models include control variables and the lagged use of funds (but not reported). The correlation of residuals across
the system of equations is not reported for brevity. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African coun-
tries drawn from Datastream over the period 2000–2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorized at the lower and
upper one percentiles. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively.
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TABLE 7 Alternative estimations of cash flow sensitivities
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
P
Usesi
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POLS CFijt 0.284*** 0.145*** 0.321*** −0.085*** −0.277*** 1.100
(0.025) (0.013) (0.033) (0.021) (0.034)
qijt − 1 −0.008* 0.003 0.016*** 0.009** −0.011*
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
N 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
R2 0.126 0.257 0.417 0.056 0.121
FE CFijt 0.415*** 0.086*** 0.192*** −0.120*** −0.119*** 0.923
(0.022) (0.013) (0.023) (0.019) (0.029)
qijt − 1 −0.002 0.004 0.011* 0.009* 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
N 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
R2 0.184 0.096 0.255 0.064 0.053
GMM3 CFijt −1.871 0.224*** 0.126*** −0.804*** −0.792 0.070
(13.404) (0.033) (0.022) (0.222) (0.621)
qijt − 1 1.120 −0.063*** 0.043*** 0.345*** 0.330
(6.584) (0.008) (0.002) (0.090) (0.301)
N 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
τ 0.272 0.324 0.802 0.279 0.284
GMM4 CFijt 0.847*** 0.237*** 0.128*** −0.664*** −0.051 1.922
(0.079) (0.033) (0.021) (0.106) (0.079)
qijt − 1 −0.214*** −0.069*** 0.043*** 0.277*** −0.033
(0.026) (0.004) (0.001) (0.028) (0.037)
N 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
τ 0.284 0.319 0.810 0.281 0.182
GMM5 CFijt 0.676*** 0.181*** 0.125*** −0.485*** −0.207*** 1.662
(0.045) (0.023) (0.022) (0.072) (0.035)
qijt − 1 −0.130*** −0.042*** 0.044*** 0.189*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015) (0.004)
N 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
τ 0.290 0.349 0.793 0.284 0.346
IV-2SLS CFijt 0.530*** 0.065*** 0.151*** −0.170*** −0.076* 0.986
(0.032) (0.017) (0.022) (0.025) (0.040)
qijt − 1 −0.032*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.032*** −0.010
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)
N 3,783 3,783 3,783 3,783 3,783
LR p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
J p-value [0.671] [0.732] [0.001] [0.556] [0.845]
IV-GMM CFijt 0.498*** 0.087*** 0.169*** −0.146*** −0.140*** 1.034
(0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.036) (0.045)
qijt − 1 −0.020*** 0.010 0.014*** 0.022 0.014
(0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.014) (0.012)
N 4,023 4,023 4,023 4,023 4,023
(Continues)
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our main findings, except for the CF sensitivity of
changes in debt (ΔD) and equity (ΔE), which appear to
be lower and higher than expected, respectively. How-
ever, as the equation-by-equation approach does not con-
sider the inter-temporal and interdependent nature of
investment and financing decisions, the results are not
entirely unexpected and should be interpreted with cau-
tion. This oversight could lead to biased inferences on CF
sensitivities (see Chang et al., 2014; Gatchev et al., 2010).
Next, we discuss the estimates of CF sensitivities
based on the higher-order moments estimator of
Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) (GMM3–GMM5) that
corrects for potential mis-measurement errors associated
with Tobin's q, a proxy of future growth opportunities.
For this part of our analysis, we estimate a modified ver-
sion of Equation (1) that excludes the lagged independent
variables (a static model) via GMM3–GMM5. Our esti-
mation results show that τ, an index of the measure-
ment quality for Tobin's q that varies between zero
(poor proxy) and one (very good), ranges between
0.182 and 0.810. This range seems acceptable in our
case. However, the estimates of the CF sensitivities
based on GMM3–GMM5 appear to be economically
implausible and in all cases violate the sources-equal-
uses-of-funds or adding-up constraint (as the sum of
the estimated CF sensitive exceeds one). This result
highlights a possible limitation of the higher-order
moments estimator of Erickson and Whited (2000,
2002), and corroborates Almeida, Campello, and Gal-
vao (2010), Chang et al. (2014) and Lewellen and Lew-
ellen (2016) who similarly find the estimates to be
imprecise in some cases.
TABLE 7 (Continued)
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
P
Usesi
LR p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
J p-value [0.286] [0.444] [0.152] [0.692] [0.116]
DGMM CFijt 0.510*** 0.051*** 0.132*** −0.201*** −0.110*** 1.003
(0.027) (0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.042)
qijt − 1 0.004** 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.008*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
N 5,301 5,301 5,301 5,301 5,301
m2 p-value [0.430] [0.553] [0.681] [0.396] [0.016]
J p-value [0.029] [0.270] [0.943] [0.569] [0.275]
SGMM CFijt 0.388*** 0.098*** 0.206*** −0.102*** −0.138*** 0.922
(0.025) (0.010) (0.053) (0.026) (0.047)
qijt − 1 −0.001 0.002 0.008 0.008* 0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
N 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
m2 p-value 0.307 0.768 0.900 0.648 0.797
J p-value [0.187] [0.815] [0.295] [0.186] [0.853]
PVAR CFijt 0.369*** 0.075*** 0.166*** −0.238*** −0.078 0.910
(0.040) (0.027) (0.028) (0.043) (0.069)
qijt − 1 −0.001 −0.002 0.002 −0.000 −0.007
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010)
N 4,662 4,662 4,662 4,662 4,662
J 87.120 87.120 87.120 87.120 87.120
J p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: The table presents the estimation results of a system of equations depicted by Equation (1) relating the uses-of-funds to cash flow and
firm characteristics.
P
Usesi = ΔCash + Capex + Div + ΔD + ΔE. τ is an index of measurement quality of Tobin's q[0 ≥ τ ≤ 1], with zero
indicating a poor proxy and one a very good proxy. LR is the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio test. m2 is a test of second-
order autocorrelation in the errors. J is the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. All models include control variables (but not reported).
The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2000–
2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles. * * *, * *, * indicate significance
at the one, five, and 10 % levels, respectively.
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We now turn our focus to estimates of CF sensitivities
based on instrumental variables 2SLS (IV-2SLS) (Baum
et al., 2008), instrumental variables GMM (IV-GMM)
(Baum et al., 2003), difference general method of
moments (DIFF-GMM) (Arellano & Bond, 1991), system
general method of moments (SYS-GMM) (Blundell &
Bond, 1998) and Panel Vector Autoregression models
(PVAR) (Abrigo & Love, 2016). These dynamic panel data
estimators have been shown to perform well in modelling
the dynamic nature of corporate decisions, while at the
same time addressing potentially endogeneity problems
(see Dang, 2013; Flannery & Hankins, 2013). The estima-
tors in our case use instruments to correct for potential
mis-measurement errors associated with Tobin's q. For
the PVAR models, we first time-demean the data and
then purge the panel FE using the forward orthogonal
deviation or Helmert transformation. We first estimate a
modified version of Equation (1) that excludes the lagged
independent variables (lagged use of funds) using instru-
mental variables 2SLS (IV-2SLS) and instrumental vari-
ables GMM (IV-GMM). For our estimation results of
Equation (1) via the difference GMM (DGMM) and sys-
tem GMM (SGMM), we do not include the lagged inde-
pendent variables of the other uses-of-funds. However,
for the estimation results of Equation (1) via the Panel
Vector Autoregression models (PVAR), we include all the
lagged independent variables (for the five uses-of-funds).
We use the second-to-third lags of the peer average
Tobin's q (the peer average Tobin's q is calculated based
on the four-digit SIC codes) as instruments for the IV-
2SLS estimator and the second-to-third lags of Tobin's q
as instruments for the IV-GMM estimator.7 To reduce
over-identification issues or problems associated with
instrument proliferation (too many instruments) (see
Roodman, 2009), we restrict our instruments to the sec-
ond-to-fourth lags for the difference GMM estimations
(DGMM), the third-to-fourth lags for the system GMM
(SGMM), and the second-to-third lags for Panel Vector
Autoregression models (PVAR).
The validity of our instruments for the difference
GMM and system GMM estimations is confirmed by both
the Hansen (J) and second-order autocorrelation (m2)
tests as they show no significant evidence of serial corre-
lation. Table 7 further shows that the sums of the esti-
mated CF sensitivities (ΔCash + Capex + Div + ΔD
+ ΔE) based on difference GMM, system GMM and
PVAR models are lower than one and closer to satisfying
the adding-up constraint (
P
Usesi = 1). In addition, and
more importantly, the hierarchy or pecking order in the
allocation of funds based the more efficient system GMM
(SGMM) is in line with our main results and suggests
that our sampled emerging market firms save most of the
operating CF. When they spend, they allocate the
remainder of the funds in order of proportions as follow-
ings—dividend payments first, followed by debt retire-
ments, then equity repurchases, and lastly, investments
(Capex). Based on the above additional findings from
instrumental variable (IV) estimators, we conclude that
our findings are robust to using alternative estimation
techniques and potential mis-measurement errors associ-
ated with Tobin's q.
As a further robustness check, we also study the time-
series variation in CF sensitivities. To accomplish this
objective, we estimate a modified version of Equation (1)
that excludes the lagged independent variables via SUR
and Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure (FM).
The Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure is
implemented as follows; (1) in the first step, cross-sec-
tional regressions are estimated for each period, and (2)
then in the second step, the coefficients from the first step
are averaged to obtain the coefficients for the full sample
period. According to Lewellen and Lewellen (2016), using
annual cross-sectional regressions (FM) corrects for both
time-series and cross-sectional dependence in firm-level
datasets, while at the same time allowing for the relation-
ship between CF and uses-of-funds to vary over time.
Table 8 summarizes the time-series estimates of CF
sensitivities.
Table 8 shows significant time series variation in CF
sensitivities. Despite this significant variation over the
sample period, the CF sensitivity of cash (savings) has
remained high relative to other uses-of-funds and ranges
between 30.3% and 68.2%. Consistent with our previous
results, debt retirements appear to have almost dis-
appeared around the financial crisis (2007–2009), and
then, rebounded post-2009. Similarly, equity repurchases
peaked in 2007 just before the onset of the financial cri-
sis and decreased significantly thereafter. These
changes are consistent with Table 5 and suggest that
the financial crisis had a significant impact on how
firms allocate funds, even in emerging markets such as
Africa that are less-integrated with the U.S., the origin
of the 2008–09 financial crisis. On overall, the SUR and
Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure (FM)
return similar estimates of CF sensitivities, which fur-
ther suggest that our results are robust to both time
variations, and using different model specifications
and estimation techniques.
For the analysis based on vintage or period of listings,
we sub-divide the sample into three 5-year sub-periods
(namely; 2000–05 (L2000–05), 2006–10 (L2006–10), and
2011–15 (L2011—15)) and categorize or classify our sam-
pled firms based on the year of listing. Based on these
sub-samples, we find significant differences in CF sensi-
tivities, with firms listed post–2011 saving and investing
relatively more than those listed in preceding sub-periods
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(L2000–05, L2006–10). Firms listed in the latter period
(2011–15) not only appear to allocate less funds to divi-
dends but also to debt retirements and equity
repurchases. These differences point to an increasing
need to enhance financing flexibility in industries that
are increasingly becoming concentrated (consolidated) as
evidenced by the decline in new listings and rise in the
untabulated Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) from a
low of 4.5 to a peak of 10.3 over the sample period.
Next, we examine the robustness of our results to
alternative sub-sampling as our sample appears to be rel-
atively heterogeneous in terms of geographic and indus-
trial distribution. In Panel A of Table 9, we split the
sample into two sub-groups; namely, South Africa and
other countries.8 In Panel B, we split the sample into five
industrial sub-groupings; namely, Industrials (IND),
Health Care (HC), Consumer Goods and Services
(CG&S), Technology and Telecommunications (T&T)
and Others (Basic Materials and Oil & Gas). Adopting
this approach enables us to assess whether the CF sensi-
tivities that we document vary across industries and
between South Africa and other countries. Using this
approach, in a way, addresses the uneven distribution of
the sample, with South Africa that is comparatively more
developed than the rest of the other countries dominating
the sample. Table 9 summarizes the estimation results for
our sub-sample analyses.
Panel A of Table 9 shows that, relative to South Afri-
can firms, firms in other African countries save similar
proportions of operating CF (the CF sensitivity of cash as
popularized by Almeida et al. (2004)). The similar CF
sensitivities of cash (savings of 46%–47%) across the sub-
country groupings are in line with our main results. They
suggest that enhancing financial flexibility is of prime
importance for firms operating in emerging markets
characterized by institutional voids. Our estimates of sav-
ings between 46% and 47%, which are one and a half to
three times higher than the 15% to 33% reported for U.S.
firms by Chang et al. (2014) and Lewellen and Lewellen
(2016), emphasizes the more central role of internal capi-
tal sources (such as retained earnings and cash reserves)
in less-developed capital markets.
On the other hand, the significant differences in the
other CF sensitivities (Capex, Div, ΔD and ΔE) between
South Africa and other countries reflect the differences in
stages of capital market development. For example, the
higher investment-CF sensitivity (Capex) of 12.8% shows
that credit constraints are more binding in Egypt, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia relative to
South Africa (with 5.7%). Similarly, South Africa appears
to have a comparatively more active equity repurchases
market, which again evidences a larger and more
developed capital market. At the same time, the higher
CF sensitivities of changes in debt (ΔD—22.3% for other
countries vs. 15.8% for South Africa) are due to the com-
paratively higher concentration of corporate debt with
shorter maturities in other African countries (55% of total
debt) relative to South Africa (44%). As most of the
emerging market corporate debt is in the form of bank
loans with shorter maturities as reported by Sorge et al.
(2017), the over-reliance on short-term debt further
increases exposure to maturity mismatch and refinancing
risks. This heavy reliance on short-term debt could be
detrimental to firms in emerging markets as it leads to
short-termism with managers focusing more on servicing
and refinancing debt at the expense of other strategic or
long-term goals.9
As a final robustness check, we examine the varia-
tions in CF allocations across broad industries or sectors.
Panel B of Table 9 shows significant variations in CF
allocations across our five broad industries.10 Firms in
the CG&S, Industrials (IND), and T&T sectors save
more than those in other sectors as they allocate
51%–58% of their operating CF to savings. In line with
our main findings, we observe that CF allocations to
investments, investment-CF sensitivity, are consistently
low across the five broad industries. This finding sug-
gests that our main results are robust to sub-sampling
by industry or sector.
We further find that the high allocation of funds to
dividends we have documented in the previous sections
is mostly concentrated in Basic Materials and Oil & Gas
sectors (Others) which dominate the emerging market
corporate universe. Our cross-industrial analyses also
reveal that sampled firms in the T&T and Others (Basic
Materials and Oil & Gas) sectors allocate the least pro-
portion of funds to debt retirements as 55%–63% of their
borrowings are in the form of long-term debt. These
allocations of funds are comparatively higher than those
for sampled firms in other sectors that have between
48% and 54% of their borrowings as short-term debt.
This high concentration of short-term debt exposes the
sampled firms to maturity mismatch and refinancing
risks, and account for the spike in CF allocations to debt
retirements that we documented preciously around the
financial crisis (Table 5). Next, we find that sampled
firms in the CG&S and Industrials (IND) sectors allocate
the least proportion of funds to equity repurchases (6%–
7%). In contrast, those in other sectors are more equity-
dependent with allocations to equity repurchases that
range from 25% to 30%. These cross-industrial variations
are not unexpected and point to significant industrial
heterogeneity in how emerging market firms use
funds.11
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TABLE 9 Cash flow sensitivities across countries and industries
Panel A: Cash flow sensitivities across countries
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
P
Usesi
FIC Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Others CFijt 0.467*** 0.128*** 0.131*** −0.223*** −0.051*** 0.996
(0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.010)
N 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142
R2 0.30 0.21 0.31 0.11 0.04
S. Africa CFijt 0.460*** 0.057*** 0.160*** −0.158*** −0.165*** 0.987
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
N 4,798 4,798 4,798 4,798 4,798
R2 0.23 0.19 0.33 0.06 0.03
Diff CF p-value [0.660] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Panel B: Cash flow sensitivities across industries
SIC Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cg&S CFijt 0.505*** 0.056*** 0.131*** −0.238*** −0.070*** 0.992
(0.020) (0.011) (0.009) (0.022) (0.021)
N 2,201 2,201 2,201 2,201 2,201
R2 0.269 0.183 0.406 0.042 0.018
HC CFijt 0.260** 0.060* −0.002 −0.393*** −0.289*** 0.990
(0.131) (0.034) (0.048) (0.111) (0.074)
N 212 212 212 212 212
R2 0.269 0.195 0.037 0.407 0.103
IND CFijt 0.582*** 0.093*** 0.033*** −0.230*** −0.063** 0.998
(0.026) (0.019) (0.011) (0.027) (0.025)
N 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684
R2 0.252 0.200 0.297 0.107 0.050
Others CFijt 0.280*** 0.121*** 0.288*** −0.064*** −0.248*** 0.989
(0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.022)
N 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371
R2 0.292 0.305 0.457 0.099 0.139
T&T CFijt 0.511*** 0.088*** 0.073*** −0.024 −0.304*** 0.992
(0.045) (0.022) (0.020) (0.037) (0.039)
N 472 472 472 472 472
R2 0.236 0.224 0.400 0.066 0.006
Note: The table presents the estimation results of a system of equations depicted by Equation (1) relating the uses-of-funds to cash flow and
firm characteristics. Panel A presents the results for the sub-samples (FIC) of other countries (Others—Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco,
Nigeria and Tunisia) and South Africa (S. Africa). Panel B presents estimation results across the industries (SIC); namely, Industrials (IND),
Health Care (HC), Consumer Goods and Services (CG&S), Technology and Telecommunications (T&T) and Others (Basic Materials and Oil
and Gas).
P
Usesi = ΔCash + Capex + Div + ΔD + ΔE. All models include control variables and the lagged use of funds (but not reported).
The correlation of residuals across the system of equations is not reported for brevity. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-finan-
cial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2000–2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and
are winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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5 | CONCLUSIONS
Using a large sample of firms from eight emerging econo-
mies over the period 2000–2015, and a system of equa-
tions that account for the overlooked inter-temporal and
interdependent nature of corporate decisions, we docu-
ment several unique insights into how firms operating in
these unique markets allocate funds to savings, invest-
ments, dividend payments, debt retirements and equity
repurchases. We advance the literature by presenting
new tests on asymmetry and non-linearities in CF sensi-
tivities for all the five uses-of-funds.
First, we find that emerging firms allocate most of
their operating CF to savings. When they spend, they
allocate funds in order of proportions to dividend pay-
ments ahead of other uses-of-funds, followed by debt
retirements, then equity repurchases, and finally, invest-
ments. This pecking order in CF allocations emphasizes
the importance of maintaining or enhancing financial
flexibility when access to external finance is limited. Sec-
ond, dividend payments, which consistently rank just
below savings, appear to be sticky-down and vital as, on
average, firms increase or maintain rather than reduce or
curtail the payouts during the financial crisis. A pressing
signalling motive mainly drives this stickiness in divi-
dends against deteriorating business fundamentals in an
environment characterized by high agency costs and
information asymmetry. Third, CF allocations to invest-
ments, investment-CF sensitivity as popularized in the
literature, are very low and appear to be poor measures
of financial constraints. They are consistently lower
rather than higher as would be expected for supposedly
constrained firms, and only increase for unconstrained
firms instead of the constrained ones during the financial
crisis. Fourth, CF allocations to debt retirements and
equity repurchases appear to be comparatively lower and
higher than those in the U.S., respectively, which reflects
the less-developed nature of emerging markets. Finally,
we document evidence suggesting that corporate invest-
ment and financing decision are significantly inter-tem-
poral and interdependent, and that, if these peculiarities
are overlooked as in the literature, could lead to biased
inferences on CF sensitivities.
In general, our empirical findings, which offer a
more holistic view of CF allocations in emerging mar-
kets, show that internal capital sources still predomi-
nate external ones. As our results show, this leads to
the prioritization of savings ahead of investments,
which hampers firm-growth, and consequently,
employment and economic growth. Our empirical ana-
lyses further reveal that investment-CF sensitivity is
not a good measure of financial constraints, even
within the context of emerging markets where access
to finance is limited, and during the financial crisis
when credit constraints were supposedly more pro-
nounced. CF sensitivity of cash, which until recently
has been overlooked in the literature, emerges as a
more reliable and informative proxy of credit con-
straints that appears to correlate significantly with
changes in capital markets. This signals the need for a
shift in research focus as economies are transiting
towards intangible capital that requires considerably
higher levels of financial flexibility, which can take the
form of spare borrowing capacity or cash reserves.
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ENDNOTES
1 See, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), Almeida and Campello
(2007), Andrén and Jankensgård (2015), Ascioglu, Hegde, and
McDermott (2008), Chen and Chen (2012), Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988), Lewellen and Lewellen (2016), Hovakimian,
Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004), Hu and Schiantarelli (1998),
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Moyen (2007).
2 There is a rich literature showing that access to finance has a posi-
tive effect on innovation and economic growth (see Acharya &
Xu, 2017; Beck, Fuchs, & Uy, 2009; Beck & Levine, 2004; Brown,
Martinsson, & Petersen, 2013; Levine, 1997).
3 Investments in physical capital have declined significantly in
advanced economies as more firms are increasingly concentrating
on innovation or research and development (Brown, Fazzari, &
Petersen, 2009; Brown & Petersen, 2009, 2015).
4 We do not use the KZ Index (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997) as in prior
studies given that our untabulated results appear to be impulsive
and unreliable. In addition, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that
the KZ Index is an unreliable proxy of financial constraints.
5 Our results are robust to mis-measurement errors associated with
Tobin's q and using several alternative estimation techniques.
6 Sorge et al. (2017) find that short-term debt constitutes as high as
51%, 63%, 42%, 78% and 49% of corporate debt in Brazil, Russia,
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India, China and South Africa, respectively. Similarly, Booth,
Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) report ranges
of 24% to 76% in short-term debt across ten developing countries
over the period 1980–1991. They further find that most of the
short-term debt is in the form of bank loans. In addition,
Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014) find that firms in Africa prefer bank
loans to non-bank debt as the former is availed with less-collateral
and mostly based on long-standing relationships. They further
find that non-bank debt is scarce and where available, it is costly
and often accompanied by restrictive covenants.
7 The peer-firm average Tobin's q is a suitable instrument as it is
less noisy and correlates with GDP growth, a measure of long-
term growth opportunities.
8 As firm-year observations for each of the other countries are few,
except for South Africa, we are unable to present and draw mean-
ingful cross-country comparisons using our multi-equation
research framework. We acknowledge this limitation in our study
and point to the lack of rich datasets as one of the main reasons
why there is a dearth of research in emerging markets (especially
in Africa).
9 Appendix B shows that our results are robust to controlling for
macroeconomic conditions and differences in the stages of eco-
nomic development across countries.
10 Appendix C shows similar variations in cash flow and uses-of-
funds across industries.
11 Appendices D and E show that our results are not affected by the
way we define the cash flow variable, a debated issued in the lit-
erature (see Chang et al., 2014; Lewellen & Lewellen, 2016).
However, we also find that the two other commonly used proxies
of cash flow (CF1 – operating income plus depreciation-to-total
assets and CF2 – net income before extraordinary items plus
depreciation minus dividends-to-total assets) to be more volatile
and less comprehensive, hence, our focus on the cash flow mea-
sure from the statement of cash flows rather than the statement
of comprehensive income.
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APPENDIX A: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
ΔCash Changes in cash and equivalent (WC02001)-to-total assets (WC02999).
Capex Physical capital investments (WC04601)-to-total assets.
Div Dividends (WC05376)-to-total assets.
ΔD Changes in total debt (WC03251 + WC03051)-to-total assets.
ΔE Changes in equity (WC03480)-to-total assets.
CF Net cash flow from operating activities (NOCF)-to-total assets.
NOCF=net income (WC04001) + depreciation, depletion and amortization (WC04051)
+deferred income taxes and investments (WC04101) + Total other cash flow (WC04151)
+extraordinary items (WC04225) + funds from other operating activities (WC04831).
CF1 Operating income (WC01250) plus depreciation (WC04051)-to-total assets.
CF2 Net income before extraordinary items (WC01551) plus depreciation (WC04051)-to-
Total assets.
Cash Cash and equivalent (WC02001)-to-total assets.
Debt Total debt (WC03251 + WC03051)-to-total assets.
q Market value of equity (MV) plus total debt (WC03251 + WC03051)-to-total assets.
SG Sales growth (WC01001)
Size Log of total assets (WC02999).
PPE Property, plant and equipment (WC02501)-to-total assets.
LogAge The current year less the first year that the firm appears in the database.
WW index −0:091× CashFlowTotalAssets −0:062×DivDummy+0:021×
Totaldebt
TotalAssets
− 0.044 × Size + 0.102 × IndustrySalesGrowth − 0.035 × SG
The WW Index is based on Whited and Wu (2006).
HP index − 0.737 × Size + 0.043 × Size2–0.040 * Age.
The HP Index is based on Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
KZ index −1:002× CashFlowTotalAssets +0:283×
Totaldebt
TotalAssets−39:368×
Dividends
TotalAssets −1:315×
Cash
TotalAssets
The KZ Index is based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
GDPG GDP growth (annual %).
IRS Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate %).
INF Inflation, consumer prices (annual %).
PVTCREDIT Domestic credit to the private sector by banks (% of GDP).
STMKTCAP Stock market capitalization-to-GDP (% of GDP).
aNote: The table lists the definitions of all variables used. All firm-level data is from Thomson DataStream, and macroeconomic variables are from The
World Bank.
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Panel A: Basic statistics across industries
Variables CF ΔCash Capex Div ΔDebt ΔEquity CF vs. uses
# SIC Metric (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Cg&S Mean 0.163 0.018 0.072 0.062 0.015 −0.074 −0.048
Median 0.152 0.006 0.060 0.049 0.000 −0.073 −0.036
SD 0.149 0.037 0.056 0.048 0.064 −0.033
N 2,201
(2) HC Mean 0.149 0.037 0.056 0.048 0.064 −0.033 0.039
Median 0.130 0.021 0.050 0.041 0.003 −0.040 −0.019
SD 0.139 0.020 0.079 0.043 0.024 −0.056
N 212
(3) IND Mean 0.139 0.020 0.079 0.043 0.024 −0.056 −0.035
Median 0.120 0.008 0.057 0.026 0.002 −0.054 −0.023
SD 0.152 0.011 0.096 0.053 0.013 −0.045
N 1,684
(4) Others Mean 0.152 0.011 0.096 0.053 0.013 −0.045 −0.04
Median 0.125 0.006 0.084 0.021 0.001 −0.035 −0.02
SD 0.204 0.020 0.076 0.069 0.016 −0.080
N 1,371
(5) T&T Mean 0.204 0.020 0.076 0.069 0.016 −0.080 −0.025
Median 0.200 0.015 0.053 0.046 0.000 −0.070 0.016
SD 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.406 0.000
N 472
Panel B: Differences across industries
Variables CF ΔCash Capex Div ΔDebt ΔEquity
SIC Metric (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) vs. (2) Mean 0.014** −0.019*** 0.016*** 0.014*** −0.049*** −0.041***
Median 0.022* −0.015*** 0.010*** 0.008*** −0.003 −0.033***
SD 0.010** 0.017*** −0.023*** 0.005 0.040*** 0.023
(1) vs. (3) Mean 0.024*** −0.002 −0.007*** 0.019*** −0.009*** −0.018***
Median 0.043*** 0.010 0.015*** 0.036*** 0.013*** −0.020***
SD 0.011*** 0.007 −0.024*** 0.009*** 0.002*** −0.029***
(1) vs. (4) Mean 0.011*** 0.007*** −0.024*** 0.009*** 0.002 −0.029***
Median 0.038*** 0.012*** −0.012*** 0.041*** 0.014 −0.039***
SD −0.041*** −0.002*** −0.004*** −0.007*** −0.001 0.006***
(1) vs. (5) Mean −0.041*** −0.002 −0.004 −0.007** −0.001 0.006
Median −0.037*** 0.003 0.019 0.016** 0.015 −0.004
SD 0.163*** 0.000 0.072 0.062** −0.391 −0.074
(2) vs. (3) Mean 0.010 0.017*** −0.023*** 0.005 0.040*** 0.023***
Median 0.010 0.013*** −0.007*** 0.015 0.001*** 0.014***
SD −0.013 0.009*** −0.017*** −0.010 0.011*** −0.011***
(2) vs. (4) Mean −0.003 0.026*** −0.040*** −0.005 0.051*** 0.012
(Continues)
APPENDIX C: Cash flow and uses-of-funds across industries
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Panel B: Differences across industries
Variables CF ΔCash Capex Div ΔDebt ΔEquity
Median 0.005 0.015*** −0.034*** 0.020 0.002*** −0.005
SD −0.065 0.000*** 0.003*** −0.026 0.008*** 0.024
(2) vs. (5) Mean −0.055*** 0.017** −0.020*** −0.021*** 0.048*** 0.047***
Median −0.070*** 0.006** −0.003*** −0.005*** 0.003*** 0.030***
SD 0.139*** 0.002** 0.079*** 0.043*** −0.382*** −0.056***
(3) vs. (4) Mean −0.013*** 0.009*** −0.017*** −0.010*** 0.011*** −0.011***
Median −0.005*** 0.002*** −0.027*** 0.005*** 0.001*** −0.019***
SD −0.052*** −0.009*** 0.020*** −0.016*** −0.003*** 0.035***
(3) vs. (5) Mean −0.065*** 0.000 0.003 −0.026*** 0.008* 0.024***
Median −0.080*** −0.007 0.004 −0.020*** 0.002* 0.016***
SD 0.120*** −0.010 0.057 0.026*** −0.404* −0.054***
(4) vs. (5) Mean −0.052*** −0.009** 0.020*** −0.016*** −0.003 0.035***
Median −0.075*** −0.009** 0.031*** −0.025*** 0.001 0.035***
SD 0.204*** 0.002** 0.076*** 0.069*** −0.390 −0.080***
aNote: The table presents time-series summary statistics and pairwise correlations between the proxies of cash flow. The sample consists of
listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2000–2015.
P
Usesi = ΔCash
+ Capex + Div + ΔD + ΔE. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles. ***, **
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel A: CF1
Models without constraints Models with constraints
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CFijt 0.177*** 0.067*** 0.166*** 0.028** −0.305*** 0.230*** 0.068*** 0.204*** −0.062*** −0.435***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
qijt − 1 0.002* 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
R2 0.118 0.185 0.307 0.050 0.112 0.112 0.185 0.298 0.035 0.087
Panel B: CF2
Models without constraints Models with constraints
ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE ΔCash Capex Div ΔD ΔE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CFijt 0.230*** 0.068*** 0.204*** −0.062*** −0.435*** 0.169*** 0.083*** 0.192*** 0.053*** −0.118***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016)
qijt − 1 0.002** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.002* 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.003** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940 5,940
R2 0.112 0.185 0.298 0.035 0.087 0.107 0.188 0.310 0.052 0.044
aNote: The table presents the estimation results of a system of equations depicted by Equation (1) relating the uses-of-funds to cash flow and
firm characteristics. Panel A presents the estimates based on CF1. Panel B presents the estimation results based on CF2. CF1 is operating
income plus depreciation-to-total assets. CF2 is net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation-to-total assets. All models include
control variables and the lagged use of funds (but not reported). The correlation of residuals across the system of equations is not reported
for brevity. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the
period 2000–2015. All variables used are defined in Appendix A and are winsorized at the lower and upper one percentiles. ***, ** and * indi-
cate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
APPENDIX D: Alternative proxies of cash flow
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